Project Agincourt for BD and Capture Teams

On September 30, 2026, the Secretary of War launched Project Agincourt to stand up an Autonomous Warfare Command by October 1, 2027. The command would own requirements, budget, and acquisition for unmanned and autonomous systems, and buy based on operator testing instead of JCIDS. For BD and capture teams, it changes who the buyer is, how vendors are picked, and how fast awards move.

What Is Project Agincourt? Inside the Autonomous Warfare Command Memo

Secretary Pete Hegseth signed the memo and announced it the same afternoon in his State of the Force address at Quantico. The memo directs the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS) to lead Agincourt, under former DIU Director Owen West and Max Strasiser.

The memo's aim is to push "decisions and dollars to the edge of our operational forces." To do that, the Autonomous Warfare Command will have its own manpower, budget, and acquisition authority, and it will define needs for the Joint Force. It will test equipment and force designs against realistic opposition in demanding exercises, modify them quickly, and field what works. The memo doesn't name the exercises. The closest model is Drone Dominance's Gauntlet events, where operators flew vendor drones against live electronic jamming.

The timeline is short. A plan of action and milestones is due within 30 days, around October 30, and work starts immediately under existing authorities. The command itself needs legislation.

Scope isn't settled. The 30-day plan will define which efforts move under Agincourt. Matthew Bernard expects large programs like Collaborative Combat Aircraft, MQ-25A, and MQ-4C to stay on the existing acquisition path.

Why Project Agincourt Matters for Defense BD and Capture

The biggest change is the buyer. Requirements, budget, and contracting authority would sit with one command, so relationships with Service program offices may count for less in this portfolio. However, the exact role the Services will play has yet to be determined.

Vendors will be selected on how their systems perform in operator testing, not on how their proposals score against evaluation criteria.

That compresses capture. There is no multi-year requirements cycle to shape, so positioning has to happen before the test event, not before the RFP.

The stakes are large. The FY27 request asks for more than $50 billion for autonomous and counter-drone systems, per drone-warfare.com; DroneXL puts it at $75 billion. And the memo calls for "a repeatable procurement system," which signals the model is meant to extend well beyond a single drone buy.

Why "Agincourt"

At the Battle of Agincourt in October 1415, an outnumbered English army under Henry V defeated a French force built around heavily armored knights. The English relied on longbowmen, who were cheap, quick to field, and effective in volume.

The memo doesn't explain the name, but the parallel is clear. It warns that "precise, low-cost weapons" produced "at massive scale" now threaten "costly legacy platforms." Bernard reads the name as moving the fletchers, the arrow makers, to the front line. That matches the memo's call for "teaming operators with innovators and competitive manufacturers." The bet is on the cheap weapon and on putting its makers next to its users.

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Project Agincourt vs. the Drone Dominance Program

Agincourt builds on the Drone Dominance Program, which DIU oversees. Drone Dominance buys one-way attack drones through "Gauntlet" events: operators fly and score vendor drones, and the top performers get fixed-price orders. It went from announcement in December 2025 to its first orders in March 2026.

What carries over

Selection. In Drone Dominance, Gauntlet scores decided who got orders. Agincourt makes operator testing the standard for the whole portfolio.
Leadership. Owen West was senior advisor for Drone Dominance before becoming DIU director. He now leads Agincourt.
Delivery. Drone Dominance moved orders from vendors who shipped late to those who shipped on time. Expect the same discipline.
Contracting. Drone Dominance used prototype Other Transaction Agreements under 10 U.S.C. § 4022 through an existing consortium (S2MARTS, run by NSTXL). Its solicitation came 15 days after the program was announced. Agincourt is likely to lean on similar vehicles.
Production. A completed Drone Dominance prototype order can lead to production "without further competition," per the Gauntlet II solicitation.

What doesn't

Scope. Drone Dominance buys one product: small attack drones. Agincourt covers unmanned and autonomous systems across the Joint Force.
Money. Drone Dominance spends $1.1 billion that Congress had already appropriated. Agincourt depends on FY27 funding that hasn't passed; the government is on a continuing resolution through December 11.
Authority. Drone Dominance is a program inside existing rules. Agincourt aims to create a four-star command, which requires legislation.
Who's involved. Drone Dominance mostly drew startups and commercial drone makers. A Joint Force portfolio will pull in primes, software firms, and Services protecting their own programs.
Speed. Drone Dominance went from announcement to orders in about three months. A new command will take longer, and its target date is a year out.

Sources for Drone Dominance details: drone-warfare.com, GovConic.

What to Do Now

Plan. Read the 30-day plan when it lands around October 30. It will show which programs move and how buying will work.
Network. Talk with your existing Service customers and autonomous systems representatives to learn their involvement going forward and what they expect from the program.
Consortia. Know which OTA consortia your buyers use, and register. Membership is usually quick and inexpensive (NSTXL runs $250–$10,000 a year by revenue and needs a CAGE code and UEI). It gets you the solicitations, not the award.
Pipeline. Flag opportunities in unmanned systems, autonomy, counter-UAS, and edge AI that could change buyers or timelines.
Testing. Find the next operator test event and prepare to deliver at volume. A strong score wins the order; on-time delivery keeps you in the next round.
Teaming. Prototype OTAs usually need a nontraditional or small-business participant. Primes need fast commercial partners; startups need partners who can scale production.
Funding. Track FY27 appropriations and the NDAA. They decide whether this is a 2027 market or a 2028 one.

GovEagle helps BD and capture teams find, qualify, and pursue opportunities at the pace this kind of buying requires.

Project Agincourt: Why BD and Capture Teams Should Be Watching